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We analyze the difference between ex ante and ex post equilibria in classical games played with the
assistance of a nonlocal (quantum or no-signaling) resource. In physics, the playing of these games
is known as performing bipartite Bell-type experiments. By analyzing the Clauser-Horn-Shimony-
Holt game, we find a constructive procedure to find two-person Bayesian games with a nonlocal
(i.e. no-signaling, and, in many cases, quantum) advantage. Most games of this kind known from
the literature can be constructed along this principle, and share the property that their relevant
ex ante equilibria are ex post equilibria as well. We introduce a new type of game, based on the
Bell-theorem by Ve´rtesi and Bene, which does not have the latter property: the ex ante and ex post
equilibria differ.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is widely accepted that Bell-type experiments and
nonlocality are deeply related to game theory. It is known
that in a classical strategic game the use of nonlocal sig-
nals may have certain benefits, such as new, better Pareto
equilibria (see e.g. Ref. [1]). Brunner and Linden [2] have
pointed out the deep relation between Bell-inequalities
and the theory of Bayesian games leading to a new in-
sight in case of both problems. This line of research is not
to be confused with “quantum game theory” [3], which
is dealing with scenarios constructed from classical non-
Bayesian games by a specific quantization procedure and
not involving quantum or other nonclassical correlations.
That kind of quantization of a classical game leads to a
modified classical game [4], while in our case the classical
game is Bayesian and not quantized, but it is played with
the aid of a nonlocal resource possibly implemented with
quantum systems.
Nonlocal correlations can lead to new equilibria in clas-
sical Bayesian games. This has attracted significant re-
search attention. The general notion of these equilibria
was studied by Auletta et al. [5]. Brandenburger and
La Mura [6] addressed the question of quantum improve-
ment from the perspective of team decision problems.
Meanwhile, there are many particular classical games
known for having an improvement when quantum non-
local resources can be used. Examples include the “pro-
totype” CHSH game which is a game-type description of
the Bell-CHSH inequality [7], the entanglement-assisted
orientation in space by Brukner [8], or the high-frequency
trading example described in Ref. [6] just to mention a
few. The CHSH game also has a conflict of interest vari-
ant [9] which inspired detailed studies of games with a
similar equilibrium structure [10–12].
These games are ad-hoc constructions; a general math-
ematical recipe leading systematically to similar games
is yet to be explored, and so is a systematic approach
to find a game which benefits from the violation of a
known Bell-inequality. In the present contribution we
deal with two-player Bayesian games having a quantum
advantage in order to make steps towards this direction.
The detailed examination of the CHSH game leads us to
a generic construction of games of the above kind which
covers the other games, and it can serve as a recipe to
find additional games of this kind. This common route
of many games with a quantum advantage has not been
pointed out before.
Having a Bell-type inequality at hand, it can be in-
structive to examine how its left-hand side relates to our
construction. Searching for the maximal value of the left-
hand side of the Bell inequality corresponds to a situa-
tion termed as ex ante in Bayesian game theory, whereas
our construction originates from the ex post situation.
These two eventually coincide in the case of the games
considered in the literature. Consequently, the difference
between these has not yet been explored.
However, the two situations can indeed differ, thereby
leading to games with a different equilibrium structure.
Here we introduce such a game: studying the Bell-type
inequality by Ve´rtesi and Bene [13], we find one which
does not follow our construction and thus has an equi-
librium structure different from that of the other known
games.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II we
summarize some concepts of game theory we shall use.
Section III is devoted to concepts related to Bayesian
games, and the relation of those games to Bell-type ex-
periments. On this basis we describe the structure of
2a ↓ b→ 0 1
0 (2, 1) (0, 0)
1 (0, 0) (1, 2)
a ↓ b→ 0 1
0 (1, 1) (0, 0)
1 (0, 0) (1, 1)
TABLE I. The Battle of sexes game (left) and the coordina-
tion game (right). The columns and rows refer to the players’
actions a ∈ A, b ∈ B, whereas the numbers in the tables are
the payoffs in the format (uA(a, b), uB(a, b)).
many Bayesian games related to Bell-type experiments
from the point of view of their equilibria, and we de-
scribe a means for constructively defining such games.
In Section IV we study the Ve´rtesi-Bene Bell-inequality
to show that it leads to a game with a different equilib-
rium structure. In Section V our results are summarized
and conclusions are drawn.
II. GAME THEORY OVERVIEW
Let us start with a brief review of some concepts of
game theory; we refer to Ref. [14] for their detailed de-
scription. Games in strategic form are common models
in game theory. In case of two players and finite strategy
sets, they are also termed as bimatrix games. A bimatrix
game is a quadruple (A,B, uA, uB), where A and B are
finite sets representing the set of actions of the two play-
ers, Alice and Bob, respectively, whereas uA and uB are
A×B 7→ R functions representing the payoff (or utility)
of each player. Throughout this paper we shall, without
loss of generality, label the actions with numbers.
A central concept of game theory is that of the equi-
librium. The (pure) Nash equilibrium of a game [15] is
a selection of actions so that it is not worth deviating
from the given strategy by any of the players unilater-
ally: (a, b) is a Nash equilibrium if
(∀a′ ∈ A) uA(a′, b) ≤ uA(a, b),
(∀b′ ∈ B) uB(a, b′) ≤ uB(a, b). (1)
As an example consider the game called “battle of
sexes”, defined in the left of Tab. I. (The common
story behind it is that Alice prefers going to the cin-
ema whereas Bob prefers going to a soccer match, but
they would like to be together.) The game has two pure
equilibria, a = b = 0 and a = b = 1.
An extension to the concept of strategies is to con-
sider probability distributions over the strategies, so-
called mixed strategies. Having pA(a) and pB(b), two in-
dependent probability distributions on Alice’s and Bob’s
side, one can calculate the expected value of the utility,
the expected payoff using the joint distribution being the
product of those on the two sides. The probability dis-
tributions are termed as mixed strategies as opposed to
the deterministic pure strategies mentioned so far. The
concept of the equilibrium can be extended in a straight-
forward manner by considering mixed strategies and the
expected payoff. According to the celebrated theorem by
Nash [15, 16], a mixed equilibrium always exists in the
games studied here. In the case of the “battle of sexes”,
in addition to the aforementioned pure equilibria, there
is also a mixed one with the probability distributions
pA = (2/3, 1/3) and pB = (1/3, 2/3), resulting in the
expected payoff of (2/3, 2/3).
Finally, an even more general equilibrium concept is
that of correlated equilibrium [17], in which we allow for
a joint probability distribution p(a, b) to determine the
choice of the players. Its definition reads
(∀a, a′)
∑
b
(uA(a, b)− uA(a′, b))p(a, b) ≥ 0
(∀b, b′)
∑
a
(uB(a, b)− uB(a, b′))p(a, b) ≥ 0. (2)
From amongst the mentioned equilibrium concepts, this
is maybe the easiest to tackle mathematically as the equi-
librium strategies form a polytope in the set of proba-
bility distributions. If, however, this distribution hap-
pens to be correlated, then in order to implement the
strategy the players may have to rely on the advice of
a trusted coordinator or they have to agree in advance
on the strategies. An example of such an equilibrium
appears e.g. in the “coordination game”, defined in the
right of Tab. I. Here p(0, 0) = p(1, 1) = 1/2 is a corre-
lated equilibrium (there are infinitely many other corre-
lated equilibria though). Coordination games frequently
appear in quantum-assisted situations. The equilibrium
in the correlated case takes the intuitive meaning that
it is not worth deviating from the advice of the trusted
coordinator unilaterally.
III. BAYESIAN GAMES AND BELL-TYPE
EXPERIMENTS
It is prevalently accepted that a Bell-type experiment
can also be interpreted as a kind of game termed as
“Bayesian game” in the language of game theory. In such
games, Alice and Bob choose some input first (or get it
from a third party). In physics we say that both Alice and
Bob choose a measurement, whereas in the game theory
language, they become aware of their types x ∈ X and
y ∈ Y first (X and Y are finite sets). Then they choose
an action, and the payoff depends on both the types and
the actions, so we have uA(a, b, x, y) and uB(a, b, x, y),
respectively, thus we have a strategic form game for each
pair of types (x, y). (Note that in many applications of
Bayesian games the payoff does not depend on the other
player’s type.) In the Bell-type experimental scenario
the actions are the results a ∈ A (b ∈ B) of the measure-
ment x ∈ X (y ∈ Y ) the latter playing the role of the
types. They are assumed to be chosen by the parties in-
dependently at will; this choice can thus be modeled as a
3x ↓ y → 0 1
a ↓ b→ 0 1 0 1
0
0 1 −1 1 −1
1 −1 1 −1 1
1
0 1 −1 −1 1
1 −1 1 1 −1
x ↓ y → 0 1
a ↓ b→ 0 1 0 1
0
0 1/2 0 1/2 0
1 0 1/2 0 1/2
1
0 1/2 0 0 1/2
1 0 1/2 1/2 0
TABLE II. The payoff function of the CHSH game (top) and
the PR-box, the no-signaling behavior maximizing it (bot-
tom). The tabular divides into blocks indexed with types.
Within each pair of types, we have a game payoff matrix sim-
ilar to that in I. There is a single payoff value in each entry
as the payoffs are equal for both parties.
probability distribution of their possible types (aka mea-
surements). In order to verify e.g. the violation of local
realism, some expression of the outcomes (aka actions) is
evaluated.
As of the equilibria of Bayesian games, there are three
situations studied in game theory. In the ex ante sit-
uation, no players know each others’ types and neither
that of their own, thus regarding equilibria, the relevant
payoffs are expected values on some prior distribution of
all types. The interim case is when each player knows
his own type but has only a probability distribution on
that of the others’. Hence, when the payoff is studied,
each player considers the expected value on the others’
types. It is prevalently known in game theory that in
the case of the games studied here the set of ex ante and
interim equilibria coincide. Finally, in an ex post situa-
tion, all players know everyone’s types, thus we fall back
to the case of simple strategic form games. So for a given
(x, y), we can consider the equilibrium properties of the
game defined by the actions and the respective payoffs
uA(a, b, x, y), uA(a, b, x, y) with x and y fixed. Hence, the
set of strategies are classified by the conditional probabil-
ity distributions P (a, b|x, y) which describe the behavior
of the nonlocal resource in a Bell-type scenario.
Consider, for instance, the case of the CHSH exper-
iment (CHSH game). The payoff is the same for both
players: uA = uB = u; it is tabulated on the upper part
of Tab II.
The expected payoff for such a game, given a uniform
prior on the types (x, y) reads
U =
1
4
∑
x,y
∑
a,b
u(a, b, x, y)P (a, b|x, y), (3)
thus it is linear in the conditional probability character-
izing the behavior. Based on the assumption on the be-
haviors as constraints of its maximization, it can attain
various maxima.
A possible assumption is locality: the conditional prob-
abilities are the convex combinations of products of de-
terministic local channels (i.e. which assign a set of
pure strategies to each type). Hence, they form a poly-
hedron in the vector space of conditional probabilities
P (a, b|x, y), which is thus naturally given in its vertex
representation, that is, as a convex combination of its
aforementioned vertices [18, 19]. This polytope is termed
as the local polytope PL. The maximization of the pay-
off in (3) subject to P (a, b|x, y) ∈ PL is a linear pro-
gram. The CHSH inequality’s RHS is this local maxi-
mum, which is 1/2 in this case. (Recall that we calculate
the ex ante expected payoffs with a uniform prior on the
types. In the classic literature of the Bell-CHSH inequal-
ity, the prevalently known local bound is 2, which is the
ex-post value, hence our bounds are to be multiplied by
4 to achieve the usual values.)
A broader class of behaviors is that of the quantum
ones. The set of quantum behaviors in the space of con-
ditional probabilities is a convex domain which is a su-
perset of PL, and can be characterized by an infinite se-
ries of semidefinite programs [20, 21]. The heuristically
determined maximal value is
√
2/2 known as Tsirelson’s
bound [22].
Finally, the broadest set frequently considered is that
of the no-signaling behaviors [19]. In their case the single
assumption is that the given resource cannot be used for
transmitting any classical information between the two
parties. Mathematically this can be formulated as the
no-signaling conditions:
∀a, x, y1, y2
∑
b
P (a, b|x, y1) =
∑
b
P (a, b|x, y2),
∀b, x1, x2, y
∑
a
P (a, b|x1, y) =
∑
a
P (a, b|x2, y), (4)
defining a polytope PNS in the space of conditional prob-
abilities again. Solving the linear program of finding the
maximal payoff in (3) subject to P (a, b|x, y) ∈ PNS leads
to the objective value of 1. (This corresponds to the
ex-post value of 4 which is known in the Bell-inequality
literature.) As in case of all such linear programs, it is
obtained at a vertex of PNS, outside PL and also outside
the quantum domain. We tabulate this behavior in the
lower part of Tab. II. The fictitious device realizing this
is the Popescu-Rorhlich (PR) box [23–26].
Let us now make two important observations. Firstly,
as the payoffs in these games are equal, maximizing the
expected payoff necessarily leads to an ex ante equilib-
rium. Were this not the case, it would be possible for at
least one player to unilaterally deviate, thereby obtain-
ing a better payoff. As the payoff of the other party is
the same, a better payoff could be obtained which would
be higher than the maximum, which is impossible. Sec-
ondly, recall that if once (x0, y0) is fixed, in the ex post
situation the payoff depends only on the actions, and
4hence the block P (a, b|x0, y0) of the conditional distribu-
tion becomes a (possibly correlated) strategy profile of
the game corresponding to (x0, y0). Hence, given such
a distribution it can be verified whether it is an equi-
librium using the definitions of equilibrium of bimatrix
games. In the case of the CHSH game, given any particu-
lar pair of types (x, y), the respective block of the optimal
no-signaling behavior is an equilibrium of the game. Oth-
erwise speaking, an ex post equilibrium is achieved. A
possible intuitive interpretation is the following. A cru-
cial assumption of the Bell-situations is that none of the
parties is aware of the other’s type. And indeed, we are
using a PR-box which is a no-signaling resource. How-
ever, our observation implies that it is not worth for any
of the players to deviate from the advice of the box, even
if they would become aware of the other’s type which is
the ex post situation. A direct calculation shows that
the same holds for the optimal quantum behavior, as it
is a convex combination of the PR-box and the uniform
distribution in all blocks.
Studying further the construction of the CHSH game
another observation can be made. If we were to search
for a game which is interesting from the point of view
of nonlocal resources and we wouldn’t be aware of this
one, it would be possible to construct it as follows. Pick
a nonlocal vertex of the no-signaling polytope PNS, this
defines a behavior. Then define the payoff matrix of a
Bayesian game so that for all the blocks for given types
(x, y), the corresponding probability distribution is its
correlated equilibrium according to Eq. (2). For a fixed
behavior p(a, b), Eq. (2) defines a nonempty polyhedron
in the space of payoff matrices, so there may be infinitely
many choices. In addition, the payoff should be chosen
such a way that the maximum of the expected payoff for
a selected prior (e.g. the uniform distribution of types)
over the local polytope PL is lower than the no-signaling
value on the chosen vertex. In our particular example,
the CHSH game could be constructed entirely from the
vertex: the PR-box, which is the only nontrivial nonlo-
cal no-signaling vertex in the two-input-two-output case.
The CHSH game can be obtained along the above lines.
As the expected payoff is a linear function, and the quan-
tum domain is a convex one between PL and PNS, it is
likely that there will be a quantum advantage, too.
All the two-player games with a quantum advantage
we are aware of derive from this construction. The ex-
amples include the high-speed trading example by Bran-
denburger and La Mura [6] and the spatial orientation
game by Bruckner [8], two games found in a heuristic
way independently from each other. These two differ-
ent payoffs can be derived from the same vertex. The
“conflict of interest game” in Ref. [9], even though it is
not directly a coordination game, also obeys this kind of
construction, using the same vertex as the CHSH game.
x ↓ y → 0 1
a ↓ b→ 0 1 0 1
0
0 0 −c/2 c/2 −c/2
1 −c/2 0 0 0
1
0 c/2 0 −c 0
1 −c/2 0 0 0
2
0 1/2 −1/2 1/2 −1/2
1
√
2+2
4
√
2−2
4
√
2−6
4
√
2−2
4
2 0 0 0 0
TABLE III. The payoff of the Ve´rtesi-Bene game in Ref. [13],
c > 0 is a parameter.
x ↓ y → 0 1
a ↓ b→ 0 1 0 1
0
0 1 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 0
1
0 1 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 0
2
0 1 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0
TABLE IV. An optimal local behavior for the game in Ta-
ble III. The blocks in boldface are not equilibria of the game
in the corresponding block.
IV. AN EXCEPTION: THE VE´RTESI-BENE
GAME
The question naturally arises whether there are exam-
ples of Bayesian games with a nonlocal advantage which
do not obey our construction, and have a different equi-
librium structure. In search for such an exception, let us
investigate the bipartite Bell-situation which was stud-
ied by Ve´rtesi and Bene in Ref. [13] which was derived
to prove the possible nontrivial role of POVM measure-
ments in Bell-type scenarios. A peculiar feature of this
case is that Alice has 3 inputs, and only for the third
input there are 3 outputs. In case of the first two in-
puts, the number of outputs is 2. Bob has two inputs
and two outputs for both. The payoff function is tabu-
lated in Table III, with a parameter c > 0. This attains
a local bound of 1, e.g. by the vertex of the local poy-
tope tabulated in Table IV, apparently regardless of the
value of c. Note that the blocks typeset in bold are not
equilibria of the respective game (the bimatrix one de-
fined by the same block of the payoff), thus clearly the
local vertex maximizing the expected payoff belongs to a
non-equilibrium behavior.
Let us now leave the local polytope and check the no-
signaling case. It is the linear programming problem of
5x ↓ y → 0 1
a ↓ b→ 0 1 0 1
0
0 1/2 0 1/2 0
1 0 1/2 0 1/2
1
0 1/2 0 0 1/2
1 0 1/2 1/2 0
2
0 1/2 0 1/2 0
1 0 0 0 0
2 0 1/2 0 1/2
TABLE V. The optimal no-signaling behavior for the game in
Tab. III, for c > 1. The block in boldface is not an equilibrium
of the game in the corresponding block.
finding the maximum of average payoff assuming an uni-
form prior on the types. This is the objective function,
and the feasibility region is the local polytope PL, de-
fined by the trivial normalization of the behaviors and
the no-signaling conditions in Eq. (4). For c > 1, the
optimum is achieved at a vertex which corresponds to
the nonlocal behavior tabulated in Tab. V. Observe that
the optimal no-signaling vertex has a block (in partic-
ular, the one belonging to Alice’s third type and Bob’s
first type), which is not an equilibrium of the game. So
in this case the ex ante and ex post equilibria differ. In
the case of other games like the CHSH the presence of an
optimal no-signaling box can assist in the realization of
an equilibrium which could not be further improved by
letting the players to have full information of the others’
type. In contrast to that, in the just studied game the
players could further benefit from actual information on
the other’s type, albeit the nonlocal box also leads to an
improvement over the classical result. Hence, there are
games that could be played better if the players wouldn’t be
restricted to no-signaling resources but were aware of the
other’s type. Otherwise speaking, if Alice and Bob knew
each other’s type with certainty (e.g. via some communi-
cation channel), they would play differently from having
just the no-signaling box at hand. This is a feature not
present in the other known two-player games.
The question naturally arises whether this game has
similar features when a quantum box is used by the play-
ers. Ref. [13] contains an example of a quantum behavior
violating the classical bound in this case (not an extremal
one though). This is tabulated in Tab. VI. In the case of
the first two types of Alice, the CHSH case is repeated
by the construction in Ref. [13], whereas in the lowest
two blocks we have evaluated their numerical construc-
tion. Interestingly, now both of the blocks for Alice’s
type 2 (the bold-typed ones) are non-equilibria, thus this
behavior is not an ex post equilibrium. It can be verified
via direct calculation that it is an ex ante equilibrium
meanwhile.
x ↓ y → 0 1
a ↓ b→ 0 1 0 1
0
0 2+
√
2
8
2−
√
2
8
2+
√
2
8
2−
√
2
8
1 2−
√
2
8
2+
√
2
8
2−
√
2
8
2+
√
2
8
1
0 2+
√
2
8
2−
√
2
8
2−
√
2
8
2+
√
2
8
1 2−
√
2
8
2+
√
2
8
2+
√
2
8
2−
√
2
8
2
0 0.30602 0.12925 0.41652 0.01875
1 0.18243 0.11444 0.00395 0.29293
2 0.01155 0.25630 0.07953 0.18832
TABLE VI. The quantum behavior with an advantage dis-
cussed in Ref. [13]. The values have been obtained by the
direct evaluatinon of the result in the cited paper. The blocks
in boldface are not equilibria of the game in the corresponding
block of Tab III.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, we have studied two-player classical
Bayesian games played with the assistance of a nonlocal
resource. These correspond to bipartite Bell-type exper-
iments in physics. We have addressed the interpretation
of these situations in different phases of the game, de-
pending on what is revealed for the players. We have
found that the ex post equilibria and the ex ante ones
achievable with no-signaling or quantum resources coin-
cide in the games studied in the literature. In contrast
to that, we have found a game in which these equilibria
are different.
It would be interesting to find some intuitive explana-
tion of this unusual behavior of the game. It is likely
that it relates to the high asymmetry of the given situ-
ation. This also reduces the symmetries of the relevant
polytopes, which is necessary for the corresponding Bell
theorem to prove that POVM-s can have a nontrivial role
in the theory of quantum information. What we found
here is that this Bell-situation, in addition to accomplish-
ing this goal, also exhibits an interesting game-theoretic
structure, which can be a subject of further research.
Refs. [1, 5] define the notion of a variety of equilib-
rium concepts of Bayesian games played in the presence
of local resources, thereby paving the way to the study of
the equilibrium structure of these games. In the present
paper we find a generic construction for these kinds of
games, and reveal a particular property of the equilibria
which is not observable in every game.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors acknowledge the support of the National
Research, Development and Innovation Office (NKFIH)
under the contracts Nos. K124631 and K124351. M.P.
thanks GAMENET for support. We thank Gernot Alber
and Tama´s Kiss for useful discussions. A. B. wants to
6express special thanks to Tama´s Geszti.
[1] P. La Mura, International Journal of Quantum Information 3, 183 (2005).
[2] N. Brunner and N. Linden,
Nature Commun. 4, 2057 (2013).
[3] J. Eisert, M. Wilkens, and M. Lewenstein,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 83, 3077 (1999).
[4] S. J. van Enk and R. Pike,
Phys. Rev. A 66, 024306 (2002).
[5] V. Auletta, D. Ferraioli, A. Rai, G. Scarpa, and A. Win-
ter, CEUR Workshop Proceedings 1949, 198 (2017),
arXiv:1605.07896v3.
[6] A. Brandenburger and P. L. Mura,
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A 374, 20150096 (2016).
[7] J. F. Clauser, M. A. Horne, A. Shimony, and R. A. Holt,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 23, 880 (1969).
[8] Cˇ. Brukner, N. Paunkovic´, T. Rudolph, and V. Vedral,
International Journal of Quantum Information 04, 365 (2006).
[9] A. Pappa, N. Kumar, T. Lawson, M. San-
tha, S. Zhang, E. Diamanti, and I. Kerenidis,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 114, 020401 (2015).
[10] A. Rai and G. Paul, Phys. Rev. A 96, 042340 (2017).
[11] A. Roy, A. Mukherjee, T. Guha, S. Ghosh,
S. S. Bhattacharya, and M. Banik,
Phys. Rev. A 94, 032120 (2016).
[12] K. Bolonek-Lason´, Int. J. of Quant. Inf. 15, 1750033 (2017).
[13] T. Ve´rtesi and E. Bene, Phys. Rev. A 82, 062115 (2010).
[14] M. Maschler, E. Solan, and S. Zamir, Game Theory
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013).
[15] J. Nash, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
36, 48 (1950).
[16] J. Nash, The Annals of Mathematics 54, 286 (1951).
[17] R. J. Aumann, Journal of Mathematical Economics 1, 67 (1974).
[18] J. Wilms, Y. Disser, G. Alber, and I. C. Percival,
Phys. Rev. A 78, 032116 (2008).
[19] N. Brunner, D. Cavalcanti, S. Pironio, V. Scarani, and
S. Wehner, Rev. Mod. Phys. 86, 419 (2014).
[20] M. Navascue´s, S. Pironio, and A. Ac´ın,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 98, 010401 (2007).
[21] M. Navascue´s, S. Pironio, and A. Ac´ın,
New J. Phys. 10, 073013 (2008).
[22] B. S. Cirel’son, Lett. Math. Phys. 4, 93 (1980).
[23] P. Rastall, Found. Phys. 15, 963 (1985).
[24] L. Khalfin and B. Tsirelson, in Symposium on the Foun-
dations of Modern Physics, edited by P. Lahti and P. Mit-
telstaedt (World. Sci. Publ., 1985) pp. 441–460.
[25] S. Popescu and D. Rohrlich,
Phys. Lett. A 166, 293 (1992).
[26] S. Popescu and D. Rohrlich,
Found. Phys. 24, 379 (1994).
